Krepinevich on Iraq

This article has been getting a lot of interest, some of it good, some of it bad.

Krepinevich wrote The Army and Vietnam, probably my favorite book about Vietnam. For the best overview of the conflict from the American point of view, see George Herring, America's Longest War. Krepinevich decisively concluded that, whatever the political constraints placed on the Army, and whatever the ineptitude that initiated the war, the Army itself failed to develop the tactics necessary to win the war. Instead of committing itself to a genuine counter-insurgency doctrine, the Army pursued a a doctrine of attrition and firepower that might as well have been conceived of specifically in order to lose the war.

My first and foremost observation about the article is that the Army has learned nothing. While some argue that an army always fights the last war, the US Army is dedicated to fighting the war three wars back, or, barring that, refighting the Persian Gulf War of 1991. At no point after 1972 did the Army attempt to develop a counter-insurgency doctrine, despite its clear and obvious failure in Vietnam. Instead, the Army preferred to approach the Vietnam War as if it had never happened, and took steps to make sure that it would never happen again. In some sense this laudable, as the Vietnam War was a bad idea. On the other hand, an Army should prepare to fight whatever wars the civilian leadership will have it fight, not the wars it would prefer to fight.

Krepinevich is correct that the utter lack of a strategy on the part of the Army in Iraq has, and will continue to prove disastrous. He's also correct in asserting that the primary problem the Army faces is the provision of security to the civilian population. Without security, there is no private property, there is no commerce, and there is no planning for tomorrow. There is simply survival. That the Iraqi insurgency has adopted tactics (suicide bombing) and a strategy designed to maximize harm to civilians only makes the problem more difficult to solve. Finally, he's right that the Iraqi insurgents are a good deal weaker, with considerably less foreign support, than their Vietnamese counterparts.

Unfortunately, this weakness doesn't make the job any easier. Coalition forces are also smaller and weaker than in Vietnam. All of the firepower gains of the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force don't make a bit of difference in counter-insurgency warfare. While they may act as a force multiplier in conventional battle, their multiplier value in counter-insurgency is close to 1. This isn't surprising; the Pentagon hasn't been trying to increase its counter-insurgency capabilities, mostly because such an increase might lead to an actual counter-insurgency war.

Counter-insurgency warfare is not hopeless. The Malayan Emergency is not the only example of a victory against and insurgent movement. The United States defeated an insurgency in the Philippines at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Nationalist Chinese came within a hair's breadth of completely destroying the CCP in the early 1930s. The British defeated an Iraqi insurgency in the 1920s. The French won a military victory in Algeria in the 1950s, although this was accompanied by a political defeat. Several Central and South American states substantially defeated insurgent organizations in the 1980s and 1990s. It can be done. The question is whether it can still be done in this situation, with the tools available to the United States.

On this one, I have to go with the conclusion that Gilliard, Drum, Yglesias, and Cole have all come to, which is that the situation is not hopeful. I am unconvinced by Krepinevich's suggestions. Embedding US troops in Iraqi units sounds like a good idea, but given what appears to be a profound level of distrust between Iraqis and Americans, I have considerable doubt that it will work. Stopping the rotation of experienced officers and NCOs is an excellent idea, but I doubt it will have much of an effect without a fundamental change in tactics and strategy.

The centerpiece of Krepinevich's plan is the oil spot strategy, which is a sound way to fight a counter-insurgency war. In short, US forces would create an ever larger area of security in which people could live their lives free of insurgent attacks. The insurgents slowly lose support, and are forced to make ever more desperate attacks.

That's fine as far as it goes, but there are some big problems in the Iraqi case. First, several "oil spots" already exist in the Shiite and Kurdish areas, and they've done nothing to prevent violence in the Sunni areas. If anything, they've reinforced a sense of regional independence. Second, I doubt very much that the US Army is capable of the doctrinal revision that this would require. The Army would have to change at a tactical, operational, and strategic level. At the tactical level, the Army would have to accept, short term, higher casualties. It could no longer employ the kind of firepower it has become accustomed to using. That firepower kills plenty of insurgents, but plenty of everyone else, as well. The fondness for firepower has increased, not decreased, since Vietnam. I don't see it changing now. The operational and strategic changes would involve the adoption and execution of the oil spot strategy, and I don't see that happening, either. Finally, Krepinevich is up front and clear that this strategy will require more time, more death, and more expense. I, for one, believe that the American people can handle casualties, if they believe progress is being made. However, I also think that the Bush administration conduct of this conflict has permanently poisoned the public on this war. Even the supporters seem unenthusiastic, favoring the war simply in order to stick it to the "libruls".

All that said, the article is a valuable read. Krepinevich is particularly good on his discussion of metrics of success, that is, how we measure whether our tactics are working. In short, casualty rates and even attack frequency are not necessarily good measures.