Of Tacitus and Contradictions

I'll try to keep my reply to Tacitus' response to my post about the contradictions in the policies of the American pro-life movement brief, partly because once you boil off the evidence that he's read my Blogger profile--irrelevant whether it is merely an ad hominem attack or an attempt at reprehensible Horwitzian intimidation--there's not a lot of content left. His primary objection seems to be that I characterized his argument as identifying an internal contradiction within the position of pro-choicers, when in fact he merely meant to identify a contradiction between his arguments and pro-choice arguments. I certainly don't think this is clear--readers can judge for themselves--and I thought the former construction was more generous, since if there isn't an internal contradiction then the "consistent life ethic" concept is an empty shell that can encompass any combination of positions on the underlying issues. But since it's irrelevant to any of my substantive points, I'll happily concede that Tacitus merely meant to argue that the "ethic of life" compels the acceptance of pro-life premises if you accept pro-life premises, and I apologize to readers if I obscured this monumental insight. He seems similarly agitated that I did not attach any weight to his use of the word "probable" to qualify his claim about the "humanity of the innocent child." But there's no reason to, since the argument doesn't have any discernible consequences (and, of course, is not inconsistent with my argument that many pro-lifers lack the courage of their supposed convictions.) First of all, I don't see what meaning the use of the language of probability can have with respect to an argument that is, at bottom, moral and ethical as opposed to empirical or predictive. Even leaving that aside, Trevino argues that being certain about this "humanity" and believing it is probable should lead to...the same outcome. And, similarly, the qualification does not make the argument that the 13-week-old fetus is the equivalent of a baby an iota more plausible to me, since I am certain that it is not. And even if I were to accept the "probable" equivalence of fetus and baby, I would still believe that the (certain) human rights of the woman would trump the (possible) rights of the fetus, and for reasons I will reiterate imminently I would not support the criminalization of abortion absent a strong social consensus that the fetus was the same as a child. So, I will continue to ignore this qualification, because it contributes nothing of value or interest to the discussion; like the invocation of a "consistent ethic of life" itself, it leaves all a priori positions as it found them.

What is most important to emphasize is that with respect to my central arguments--that the arguments of most mainstream American pro-lifers are riven by substantial internal contradictions, that the opposition to choice is bundled up with extremely reactionary conceptions of gender roles and human sexuality, and that these contradictions manifest themselves in attempts to criminalize abortions and lead to other bad policy outcomes--Trevino is either silent or concedes the point. His only response to these arguments is to argue that "[t]he world is messy, and political movements are cobbled-together monsters that make little sense in the details -- even as they are crystal clear on the One Big Thing." This response is unsatisfactory for a couple of reasons. First of all, the argument about the need to finesse disagreement in broad coalitions can explain compromises within major political parties, but it cannot explain contradictions among pro-lifers themselves. More importantly, these contradictions are important precisely because they fatally undermine the claim that pro-lifers are "crystal clear on the One Big Thing." As moral questions go, the moral status of killing children is a pretty easy one, and in fact we already have laws in place that express universal condemnation of the practice. The unwillingness of most pro-lifers to accept the logical consequences of the claim that abortion is like killing a baby means that either 1)they do not really believe the One Big Thing they purport to believe, or 2)they are unwilling to apply this logic with an even minimal level of consistency, which combined with their general preference for patriarchal sexual regulation when it conflicts with the protection of fetal life greatly undermines the defensiblity of laws that criminalize abortions. (Using state coercion to force women to carry pregnancies to term in order protect the life of a child is potentially defensible; using it to compel women to make sexual choices that reactionaries consider appropriate, rather less so. And perhaps the next installment in the "consistent life ethic" series can explain why so many pro-lifers would prefer that women die of cancer as opposed to giving them immunizations that could mean that they will have sex more often.) In addition, these contradictions are not merely academic. I maintain the position--however unfashionable in the age of Bush--that liberal democracy requires a prohibition on self-exemption from general laws, and just as I don't believe that we should apply drug laws to poor people if we're unwilling to apply them to Rush Limbaugh, nor should we leave poor women at the mercy of back alley butchers and coathangers when we all know that affluent women will be able to quietly obtain safe abortions regardless of the legal regime. The fact that there are some pro-lifers who are genuinely principled and would be willing to treat women as responsible moral agents and apply the law consistently--something I have never denied, and people to whom my previous post was obviously not directed--is beside the point. As both the unwillingness of a majority of pro-lifers to apply the logic of their underlying position consistently and the historical unwillingness of states to enforce abortion bans rigorously make quite clear, such principled pro-lifers are a minority within the pro-life minority, and in the current cultural and political context any bans on abortion would be subject to grossly inequitable enforcement. (As Mark Graber says, if pro-lifers have a strategy for enforcing abortion laws less arbitrarily than they were when social norms against abortion were far stronger, it's the best-kept secret in American politics.)

So we are back to where we started. Needless to say, I am unmoved by his assertion-without-argument that my judgment that abortion is not in any way comparable to killing a child is a "profoundly foolish position." And until Tacitus and his fellow travelers are able to convince the people who ostensibly believe it that fetuses within women's bodies are no different than children, I see no reason to engage with the claim.