Wednesday, March 15, 2006

Children and the Vote

When I teach American Political Thought, I close with what always turns out to be a vigorous class discussion on Michael S. Cummings essay "On Children's Right to Vote"* which is a brief, uncompromising case for extending the franchise to those under 18. My pedagogical reason is clear--they've all had the luxury of being casually correct and shaking their heads in dismay at the various arguments and justifications for *not* extending the franchise and full citizenship to various oppressed groups. Reading this essay, rightly or wrongly, tends to put most of them on the side of tradition and exclusion. Even those who are 100% convinced the proposal is insane tend to find this new position they find themselves in rather uncomfortable.

But I want to talk briefly about Cummings argument (sorry, it's not available online) because it's surprisingly seductive. I'll summarize it in a series of premises:

1) The exclusion of any group from the franchise requires positive justification, as exclusion based on tradition has a poor track record.

2) The argument that children would take the responsibility of voting less seriously than other groups is an argument we'd reject out of hand if applied to other groups, even if it were empirically demonstrable.

3) The argument that children generally aren't full economic citizens with jobs and taxes is a) often untrue and more often partially true, and b) is also true of many adults, but we'd never tolerate arguments to disenfranchise the chronically unemployed or dependent adults, and c) is perhaps the point. Those without economic power are more likely to need other means to protect themselves.

4) Children's interests are represented by their parents and guardians. True in theory, but often false in practice. Children have a pretty clear stake in the boundaries and limits of parental discretion, which is determined as a matter of public policy. Moreover, the same argument was made--and widely accepted--on behalf of married women. Cummings, citing his own public opinion data on children, notes that children's views on corporal punishment are quite different from that of adults, and more in line with the current consensus amongst psychologists on the issue. Step back and look at this situation--the law authorizes violence against a particular group of people for their good. The best scientific data we've got suggests this is incorrect. The group against whom the violence is authorized agrees with the science. However you feel about this issue, this state of affairs should be enough to shed some doubt on the work that can be done by this premise.

Moreover (and as with women in the past) the weight placed on this premise can't account for the fact that for children as a group this arrangement has serious limitations. Compare for a moment the spending and care society provides for the two groups who are vulnerable due to their age: children and the elderly. Anyone who thinks the disparity in security and resources devoted to these two groups has nothing to do with their relative electoral power? Between 1975 and 1990, 7.5% of GNP was spent on the elderly, and only 2% on children.** This despite the fact that most adults agree more or less with the view that justice demands we provide all children with subsistence support and a fairly costly education. Moreover, as Shrag notes, why should the children of parents who don't vote be left unrepresented, through no choice of their own?

5) The objection that children will support policies that are selfish and illogical is undoubtedly true. Their opposition to corporal punish may be on solid ground, they might plausibly support the elimination of wise and necessary parental powers. This, again, fails to mark of children as a group different from the rest of us. The very wealthy support utterly irresponsible and economically disastrous tax cuts, but we still let them vote.

6) The status of children as a group is different than other groups denied the franchise in one obvious way--childhood is temporary, whereas being a woman or an African-American in permanent. This is, of course, true, and it certainly seems significant. Still, there's a missing premise or three for this fact to justify disenfranchisement. I'm not saying they don't exist, I just haven't heard them clearly articulated.

7) Children will simply vote as their parents do. a)this isn't always true, and b)to the extent that it is true, it generally continues on into adulthood. This was assumed to true of women and their husbands as well. Next.

A host of other arguments come up in class discussion, but I've yet to hear the argument that I find satisfactory. This doesn't mean I'm going quite prepared to endorse the proposal. So I'm curious: excluding practical concerns and Burkean conservatism (and the latter is probably the reason I can't quite endorse the proposal, but I really don't like relying on Burkean caution alone to support my policy preferences), what's the best reason to exclude children from the franchise? What are my students and I missing?

*Pages 558-562 in Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Michael S. Cummings, eds, American Political Thought 5th ed. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.

**Data from Paul Peterson, cited in Francis Shrag, "Children and Democracy: Theory and Policy," Politics, Philosophy, Economics 3:3 (2004), pp. 365-379, at pg. 375.