On How Neocons Feed Off One Another...

American neoconservatives tend to get hostile when you make the point that every country has its neocons. The response typically runs something like this:

How can you possibly compare me with those Russians/Chinese/Iranians? Don't you understand that I cloak my hawkish right wing nationalism behind a thin veneer of concern for human rights!?!?

Neocons also tend to get hostile when you point out that hawkish foreign policy pronouncements and actions feed hardliners in foreign countries. The ideology of toughness extends beyond the borders of the United States; the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian versions of Chuckie Krauthammer are at this very moment insisting that the projection of power, resolve, and toughness will force the Americans to back down/give up/stop poking us/do something.

The implications of handing foreign policy to people committed to the rhetoric of toughness should be obvious. A demonstration of "resolve" on the part of the United States is matched by a similar demonstration on the part of the Chinese; a weapon system intended as a "bargaining chip" spurs development of a corresponding system by the Russians; insistence on "regime change" in Iran empowers the people who have always argued that the United States intends to conquer Iran. And then we get things like this:

China said late Monday that it had successfully tested the nation’s first land-based missile defense system, announcing the news in a brief dispatch by Xinhua, the official news agency. “The test is defensive in nature and is not targeted at any country,” the item said.

Even if news accounts on Tuesday did not provide details about the test — and whether it destroyed its intended target — Chinese and Western analysts say there is no mistaking that the timing of the test, coming amid Beijing’s fury over American arms sales to Taiwan, was largely aimed at the White House.

In recent days, state media have been producing a torrent of articles condemning the sale of Patriot air defense equipment to Taiwan. China views the self-ruled island as a breakaway province, separated since the civil war of the 1940s, and sees arms sales as interference in an internal matter.

I'm of the opinion that carefully managed and limited US arms sales to Taiwan are both wise and appropriate. However, even if you agree with the Chinese position, or at least believe that the US should stay out of the relationship, how could you think that a Chinese ABM test would have an even vaguely positive effect on US behavior? Does anyone now believe that it is less likely that the US will transfer F-16s and Patriot missile systems to Taiwan?

I appreciate that weapons need to be tested and domestic constituencies need to be appeased, but it seems clear that the Chinese intended this test as a warning to both the US and Taiwan. I suspect that the Chinese intended this message to say:

Please respect China's territorial integrity, and right to manage its sphere of influence.

I very much doubt that this is the message Americans will hear. More specifically, I doubt that the right people will hear this message in the way the Chinese want. Instead, those voices who have always insisted that the Chinese are an incorrigible threat, that they cannot be dealt with, and that they only understand the language of force will be enabled. To manage the next foreign policy dispute with China in a wise and measured fashion will become "appeasement of the aggressor." Voices in Beijing will be making precisely the same argument.

I suspect that international franchising of the Weekly Standard might be an excellent investment opportunity.

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Israeli Missile Defenses

Check out this (somewhat dated) article on Israeli missile defenses. The article makes the point that Israel's missile defenses have progressed to the point that even a concerted Iranian ballistic missile attack, fielding far more weapons that Iran is expected to have in the next twenty years, could not hope to destroy Israel's capacity to retaliate. An Iranian attack on Israel might fail entirely, and in any case would be utterly suicidal. Also note that several Israeli officials argue that the Iranian regime is NOT suicidal. All of this kind of makes me wonder about two things:

1. Why do we continue to hear nonsense about "one bomb" being able to destroy Israel, followed quickly by nonsense about how the US would be unwilling to respond on behalf of a country that no longer exists? Neither of these points are defensible; while an advanced, massive multi-megaton Soviet nuclear warhead might be able to destroy Israel in one chunk, any Iranian weapon fielded in the next forty years is certain to have a yield measured in double digit kilotons, and thus incapable of destroying Israel in a moment. Such an attack would give Israel a really bad day/month/year/decade, but Israel would respond by giving Iran a really bad century/millenium/what's longer than a millenium?.

2. Why does Israel need to attack Iran to destroy its nuclear program? The answer would seem to be some sort of nebulous claim about how Iranian nuclear weapons would somehow immeasurably improve Iran's negotiating position in the Middle East; Iran and its allies would suddenly become emboldened, or something. This ignores a) the reality that states balance against power and threat, and b) the reality that nuclear states very often have a bloody difficult time getting what they want from non-nuclear states. The entire argument seems based on a 1962 Paul Nitze vision of nuclear weapons, in which more nukes automatically grant extraordinary diplomatic leverage. Allowing that there's something to the stability-instability paradox, I think it's fair to say that nuclear weapons have, at best, proven to be blunt, unsophisticated, and not terribly useful tools of diplomacy.

The caveat is this, and it goes to the heart of problems with the strategic implications of ballistic missile defense. The tighter Israel weaves its ABM shield, the less likely that any attack by terrorists or by a suicidal (yes, I know) Iran is to be delivered by ballistic missile. The same is true for the United States; Heritage is dedicated to wasting everyone's time by claiming that terrorists could launch a nuclear armed SCUD from an offshore barge, without ever asking why terrorists would bother to buy the SCUD when they could just sail the ship into Boston Harbor. Unlike the US, I don't think that Israeli strategic ballistic missile defense is a waste of time; the country is small enough that a conventional ballistic missile assault could do damage, and has suffered such an attack in recent memory. But I suppose the takeaway is simply that there is no "magic bullet" that can provide complete security.

Better propaganda, please.

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SRBMs Shifting Straits Balance Towards PRC?

A few years ago, a student of mine worked out the implications of a large scale Chinese SRBM (short range ballistic missile) attack on Taiwan. He argued that the attack was, based on the historic resilience of regimes to coercion by air assault, unlikely by itself to break the will of the Taiwanese government to resist. It won't surprise readers of this blog to learn that I agreed with this conclusion. However, he didn't really go into the implications of a conventional ballistic missile attack launched against military targets on Taiwan, in particular Taiwan's air bases and fighter aircraft. At Foreign Policy, David Shlapak has an article based on the recent RAND study he co-authored on the likely course and outcome of a PRC-Taiwan conflict. Shlapak argues that a preparatory ballistic missile assault on Taiwan would stand a very high chance of devastating the Taiwanese air force, and of giving China air superiority in any conflict. GPS guidance has rendered SRBMs radically more accurate, improving their ability to strike air bases and other military infrastructure.

Although I haven't read the RAND study, the argument seems pretty compelling to me. I would suggest a few caveats:

1. It seems highly unlikely that a PRC-Taiwan war would result from a surprise Chinese attack. Rather, Taiwanese forces would probably be at high alert. This means that a larger percentage of the fighter force would be aloft at time of attack. However, if the airbases themselves are rendered unusable, this doesn't matter very much.
2. Shlapak suggests that US air bases would also be vulnerable to Chinese SRBM or MRBM attack. While this is technically possible, I suspect the Chinese would be deeply reluctant to escalate the conflict through attacks on US targets, including airbases in friendly countries. While we couldn't necessarily expect to have full freedom of action from Guam or elsewhere, I doubt that US forces would fall victim to a surprise attack.

Shlapak argues that dispersing assets, hardening shelters, and increasing missile defense capabilities are the only real options that the Taiwanese have. In this context, I concur with the last point; missile defense may be nearly useless in a strategic nuclear sense, but it's helpful against a large scale conventional ballistic missile attack. However, SRBMs are cheaper than interceptors; it seems likely that the Chinese will simply be able to overwhelm any Taiwanese system with sheer numbers.

I think that the takeaway is this; there was a long window in which Taiwan was probably capable of preventing a Chinese invasion, even assuming no US intervention. That period is closed, or closing; the balance between Taiwan and China, sans the development of Taiwanese nuclear weapons, is moving inexorably in China's direction. This does not mean that war is inevitable, as China has lots of fabulous reasons for not launching a war of conquest. I think that it does, however, mean that China has greater leverage over Taiwan on a whole host of issues of dispute between the two states. It also means that the United States faces a more difficult choice regarding its level of engagement if the PRC-Taiwan relationship goes hot.

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Who Knew that Radical Right Wing Nationalists Could Disagree?

Especially when they come from different countries?

Former Ambassador Martin Indyk revealed an interesting wrinkle to the story of Eastern European missile defense system, which the Obama administration canceled last month, a move conservatives have heavily criticized as — what else? — appeasement.

Recounting recent meetings with Israeli national security officials, Indyk said that “the Israelis were upset at the way that Bush had offended Russia with missile defense” in Eastern Europe. The Israelis, like many Americans and most of the rest of the world, saw the deployment of untested missile defense technology in Poland and the Czech Republic as needlessly provocative of Russia, whose support is seen as necessary for any effort to bring Iran’s nuclear program under control.

Speaking about President Obama’s engagement policy, Indyk said “The key to this strategy has always been Russia,” because of their close relationship with the Iranians, and Obama “is bringing them [the Russians] around.” After the administration announced the canceling of the missile defense system, Indyk said, the Russians told the Iranians “if you do not go along with the proposal to ship out low enriched uranium” to Russia for reprocessing, “then you will be on your own.”

President Obama’s diplomacy “is about trying to concert the international community into a solid block against the Iranian nuclear program such that the Iranians would see that it is not in their interest to pursue nuclear weapons.” Indyk said “That is what is happening now.”

Yglesias:

A simple point but an easy one. Right-wing Israelis can easily afford to hope for the United States to take a neoconnish line on Iran. And right-wing Poles can afford to hope fro the United States to take a neoconnish line on Russia. But the desires of right-wing Israelis are in significant tension with those of right-wing Poles. And officials in the United States of America can’t realistically take a maximalist line on every point of geopolitical tension. Regional powers basically have their priorities set for them by circumstances. But the hegemon has the luxury of deciding what it cares about. That luxury, however, doesn’t eliminate the basic need to decide.

There are some interesting observations to be made here regarding interdependence of commitments. Neoconservatives are HUGE on reputation; a reputation for weakness means that the terrorists will destroy us, while a reputation for strength means that they'll cower in their dark caves until they undergo conversion and emerge as fierce advocates of Reaganomics. Indeed, neoconservatives elevate this conception of reputation above all other diplomatic considerations, such that any move that takes into account the genuine foreign policy concerns of Russia, China, or Iran in fact indicates weakness, and thus should be avoided. This concept achieved a certain Purity of Essence in reference to missile defense; once the technological justification for the Eastern European systems was removed, all that was left was the need to demonstrate our strength to the Russians, which we would accomplish by wasting money on a pointless system that most Eastern Europeans didn't want.

For American neocons, the pro-Israel logic worked as followed: If the United States demonstrated an irrational commitment to a useless system just to piss off Russia, then it would indicate that the US would pay high costs to do irrational things in support of Israel. If we failed to push forward with the missile system, then our commitment to expensive, irrational programs would be in question, Israeli "will" would fracture, and the Jordanians would push the Israelis into the sea, or something. As all commitments are interdependent, the North Koreans would soon conquer Japan, Turkey would capitulate to Tehran and work to restore the Caliphate, Brazil would elect Hugo Chavez as God Emperor, and Washington State would secede and join Canada.

Of course, real Israelis have to actually live in Israel, and they saw the world a bit differently. Israeli hawks recognize that the US commitment to Israel matters in a non-rhetorical way. The defense system in Poland had no practical, real world impact on Israeli security. Moreover, Israel actually needs to deal with Russia; simply intimidating Moscow into acquiescence isn't on the table. Maybe US flexibility on missile defense wouldn't make the Russians more flexible on Iran, but a US hard line certainly wasn't helping matters. Accordingly, the Eastern European system was worse than useless to the Israelis.

None of this is terribly complicated. These observations are only useful in so far as they fracture the neoconservative vision of seamless alliance of liberty against tyranny, in which American, Israeli, and Polish hawks all have the same interests and policy preferences. It turns out, rather, that neither the Poles nor the Israelis care overmuch about the other; rhetorical support for the neocon vision of liberty/missile defense/bunker busting/awesomeness/sexy/democracy/whiskey collapses in the face of real world material interest. In the end, it's almost as if our allies value material and institutional commitments to their defense more than they value a nebulous American reputation for "toughness".

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On Paying the Price

Mike Goldfarb and I have fun re: missile defense. Here Mike insists that Obama will pay a price for killing the Eastern European system, and I disagree:

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Europe Roiling!!!! Seriously!!!

Here's a magic trick in the making! A key element of the conservative case against Obama on missile defense is that cutting the program will undercut our allies, and that it represents a "betrayal" of the brave Poles and Czechs who are willing to stand up against the Russian bear and accept large sums of our money. See this article on how the decision has "roiled" Europe, and this article on how Europeans are "angry". The former article is particularly noteworthy, in that it includes quotes from the following persons:

• President Barack Obama
• Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kohout
• Poland's foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski
• Former Polish President Lech Walesa
• Arizona Sen. John McCain
• Former Assistant US Secretary of Defense Mary Beth Long
• NATO secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen
• An Anonymous Israeli official
• Russia's ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin
• Member of the Russian Duma Konstantin Kosachev

Ok, so four of those aren't European. Let's cut them out, leaving:

• Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kohout
• Poland's foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski
• Former Polish President Lech Walesa
• NATO secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen
• Russia's ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin
• Member of the Russian Duma Konstantin Kosachev

Ok, and let's pretend that Russians aren't European:

• Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kohout
• Poland's foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski
• Former Polish President Lech Walesa
• NATO secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen

Ok, so Rasmussen actually had really nice things to say about the decision, so let's cut him:

• Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kohout
• Poland's foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski
• Former Polish President Lech Walesa

Kohout is quoted as follows: "'Canceling the radar by no means jeopardizes the security of the Czech Republic as the country is safely entrenched in NATO.'" Hurm. That actually doesn't sound like "roiling" to me, and it's not surprising given that 70% of Czechs oppose the shield. Let's cut him out.

• Poland's foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski
• Former Polish President Lech Walesa

Sikorski is interpreted thusly: "Radoslaw Sikorski, said he had secured assurances from Washington that the U.S. would honor a commitment to deploy Patriot missiles in Poland, made as part of the deal to host the shield." Huh. Again, a notable lack of roiling. Let's cut him.

• Former Polish President Lech Walesa

Walesa is quoted saying: "'It's not that we need the shield, but it's about the way we're treated here.'"

OOOOOOKKKKKKKAAAAAYYYYY...... So, in an article about the "roiling" that has been inflicted by Obama upon Europe, exactly one European is quoted as expressing unhappiness, and that European specifically notes that the shield was unnecessary.

I'm not sure that the United States is ever going to recover from a diplomatic disaster of this magnitude....

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All BMD, All the Time

I have some more missile defense thoughts at Guardian: Comment is Free. See also Bryan McGrath on what this means for sea-based missile defense.

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On the Surrendering to the Commies...

I do love this bit, from Michael Goldfarb:

The consequences of this action in Eastern Europe, especially in Ukraine and in other countries that feel vulnerable to Russian power, will be disastrous. It is a major American retreat in the face of Russian bullying. And we will get absolutely nothing for it.

Wow, yeah; I mean, when the US was planning on building a missile defense shield in Poland, it like totally stopped the Russians from bullying their neighbors. And now that Ukraine realizes that we won't be building a system that can't protect from Russian missiles in a nearby country, they'll, like, totally give up or something. And as for the Poles, I only wish their were SOME way of conveying the idea that the US was committed to Polish territorial integrity.... some way.... some way...

I hope you'll also take note of the bait and switch. Five years ago, we desperately needed this missile shield to defend us from TEH SCARY IRANIANS, and it was soooo important that it was worth pissing off the Russians. Now, not a word about the Iranians; the whole POINT of the system is that it pisses off the Russians. Let's say that again; the US should spend bucketloads of money on a system with no strategic rationale beyond its own existence. For Goldfarb, the fact that the Russians don't like it is reason in and of itself to build the damn thing.

Call this reason #344366377 for why it's utterly insane to take seriously conservative protestations of "fiscal responsibility," and "big government waste."

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Missile Defense Done

No Eastern European missile defense shield:

The Obama administration is expected to announce Thursday that it will shelve plans to deploy its controversial anti-ballistic missile shield in Eastern Europe, a Polish official said, a move that will be welcomed by Russia but deeply regretted by Poland and the Czech Republic, two key American allies.

Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told The Associated Press on Wednesday that the administration was “very close” to the end of a seven-month review of a missile defense shield proposal but he would not give any more details.

Polish and Czech officials said they expected to be briefed by American officials about Mr. Obama’s decision which almost certainly will led to the scrapping of plans to deploy 10 inceptors in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic.

That keening you hear is the sound of a million wailing wingnuts. The Poles and Czechs will be disappointed, but they'll live; there are other ways of conveying a long term commitment to Eastern European security if we so choose. Indeed, some of these ways might actually have something to do with Eastern European security, rather than with a set of expensive techno-fantasies jury-rigged to a manufactured geo-strategic threat. Nevertheless, the screech of "EMP!!!" is one that you can get used to hearing in the near future; no President actually born in the United States would be so dismissive of ineffectually (but expensively!) protecting America from non-existent boogeymen.

Let's be clear; this is a huge victory for common sense over fantasy, and for responsible defense budgeting. This project had no function other than to serve the pecuniary interest of the missile defense industry, and to sate the ideological lust of conservatives infatuated with St. Reagan. No convincing strategic logic could ever be provided for the program; advocates careened wildly between arguments, desperately trying to see if they could make anything stick. Protecting Europe from Iranian missiles? Nobody in Europe was particularly concerned, or, outside of Poland and the Czech Republic, really wanted the defense. Protecting from the Russians? By the admission of advocates, the shield could not have served as a deterrent to Russian attacks. Necessary to demonstrate our commitment to the Poles? Meh; I'd rather get them something they could actually use.

... it's old, but this post from Robert Gard is pretty definitive regarding the serial idiocy of missile defense proponents. I should also make clear that I think missile defense systems can be useful tactically, and even strategically against the threat of a large number on conventionally armed ballistic missiles. Missile defense is never sold on that basis, however, mainly because advocates have not even the faintest interest in engaging in an actual debate about costs and benefits.

...it's done:

The Obama administration's move was confirmed by the Czech Republic interim prime minister. "Just after midnight I was informed in a telephone call by President Barack Obama that [his] administration has decided to pull out from the plan missile defense shield installations" in the Czech Republic and Poland, said Jan Fischer said at a news conference Thursday.

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