India on the Atlantic

I have an article at Pragati: Indian National Interest Review about the treatment of India in the 2010 QDR. The title ("Putting India on the Atlantic") isn't mine, but it's an excellent summary of the piece:

In an important sense, the 2010 QDR “Europeanises” India. It assumes that India will, minor friction aside, act in the general interests of the political and economic order that the Atlantic powers have established, just as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and NATO have acted for the past several decades. This framework is unquestionably productive. It sets Indian foreign and military policy apart from either Pakistan or China by treating the former as a solution and the latter two as problems (even if India isn’t described as a solution to the particular problems posed by either China or Pakistan). It opens space for thinking seriously about the role that the Indian military could play in maintaining regional stability, and hints at both avenues for cooperation and a desired Indian force structure.

However, the program set forth in the QDR hinges on the assumptions that Indian and US interests will not diverge substantially, and that India is interested in playing the role that the US wants it to play.

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Quizzical Defense Rhetoric (QDR)

Finally had a look at the 2010 QDR on the plane to New Orleans yesterday. I don’t mean to poke fun of our defense establishment’s hard work. I promise I’ll have some kind of substantive comment on the human security dimensions of the QDR once I’ve fully digested it. But until then, I can’t help but pass along - just for fun - these rhetorical nuggets that jumped out at me:

p. v: “America’s enduring effort to advance common interests without resort to arms is a hallmark of its stewardship in the international system.”

Given the number of armed conflicts in which the US is currently embroiled – and the fact that its use of arms without UN backing is one of key reasons for the decline in US soft power over the last decade - this seemed like an oddly out-of-touch statement.

p. vi: "Until such time as the Administrations’ goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear capabilities will be maintained as a core mission for the Department of Defense.”

Oxymorons, anyone?

Finally, readers familiar with Carol Cohn’s work on the sexual politics of defense jargon might have fun with this quotation:

p. x: “US naval forces will continue to be capable of robust forward presence and power projection operations, even as they add capabilities and capacity for working with a wide range of partner navies.”

In pursuing these robust forward power projections with multiple “partner navies,” the QDR directs the following “enhancements” to US “force structure” on p. ix:

"Exploit advantages in subsurface operations;

Increase the resiliency of US forward posture and base infrastructure;

Enhance the robustness of key ISR capabilities;

Secure vulnerable nuclear materials..."

And finally my favorite, a section on pg. 31 entitled “Deter and Defeat Aggression in Anti-Access Environments”

“Anti-access strategies seek to deny outside countries the ability to project power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing actions to be conducted by the anti-access power. Without dominant US capabilities to project power, the integrity of US alliances and security partnerships could be called into question, reducing US security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.”

Go wild, commenters.

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QDR Roundup

I have an article up at TAP on the QDR and the end of the Long War. I also have a couple of posts up at ID on the QDR, including this on improving Air Force foreign training practice, and this on innovation in the defense industry.

Here's some other groovy stuff to read on the QDR:

• Max Bergmann wonders about the implications of the QDR for nuclear weapon policy.
• Christian at Defense Tech says that Air Force COIN advocates see a big QDR win.
• Brad at Wonk Room talks more about climate change in the QDR.
• Yglesias holds forth on the Minerva Initiative.
• Jason Sigger gives his QDR take here. He also disagrees with me on some points regarding LSIs.
• CNAS gives its take on the budget and the QDR.
• Attackerman suggests that the counter-insurgents have won, at least in the QDR. More on that later.
• Galrahn is not wholly pleased with the QDR approach.

I'll try to get to a few specific questions that people have asked in comments later today.

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QDR Bloggingheadsing

Eli Lake and I talk QDR, and Long Wars against abstractions. Here we venture into the War on Drugs:

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QDR Blogging: Climate Change and the DoD

See Loomis.

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QDR Blogging: Acquisition Reform and the Civilian Workforce

While the 2006 QDR talked a bit about problems in acquisition and the need for acquisition reform, and a bit about the need to hire and retain the right skills in the DoD civilian workforce, but didn't really draw any connections between the two. The 2010 QDR (p.76):

The Pentagon's acquisition workforce has been allowed to atrophy, exacerbating a decline in the critical skills necessary for effective oversight. For example, over the past ten years, the Department's contractual obligations have nearly tripled while our acquisition workforce fell by more than 10 percent. The Department also has great difficulty hiring qualified senior acquisition officials. Over the past eight years the Department has operated with vacancies in key acquisition positions averaging from 13 percent in the Army to 43 percent in the Air Force. There remains an urgent need for technically trained personnel-cost estimators, systems engineers, and acquisition managers-to conduct effective oversight.

On the next page, the QDR calls for the hiring of 20000 additional acquisitions personnel to make up for this shortfall. I suspect that the major reason that we see this in the 2010 QDR and not in the 2006 is that the Obama administration has rejected the idea that essential DoD responsibilities can be privatized and out-sourced. The downsizing and outsourcing of the acquisitions workforce isn't entirely the responsibility of the Bush administration, as it was also pursued under Clinton. Lead Systems Integrators, in which civilian contractors managed major programs such the Coast Guard's Deepwater program and the Army's Future Combat Systems, were part of this project. LSIs were also one of the very, very few "privatization" initiatives that failed so abjectly that pretty much no one wants to try them again.

See also Spencer on this point.

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QDR Blogging: You've Come a Long Way, Baby!

2006 QDR:

India is emerging as a great power and a key strategic partner. On July 18, 2005 the President and Indian Prime Minister declared their resolve to transform the U.S.-India relationship into a global partnership that will provide leadership in areas of mutual concern and interest. Shared values as long-standing, multi-ethnic democracies provide the foundation for continued and increased strategic cooperation and represent an important opportunity for our two countries.

2010 QDR:

As the economic power, cultural reach, and political influence of India increase, it is assuming a more influential role in global affairs. This growing influence, combined with democratic values it shares with the United States, an open political system, and a commitment to global stability, will present many opportunities for cooperation. India's military capabilities are rapidly improving through increased defense acquisitions, and they now include long-range maritime surveillance, maritime interdiction and patrolling, air interdiction, and strategic airlift. India has already established its worldwide military influence through counterpiracy, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief efforts. As its military capabilities grow, India will contribute to Asia as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

In just four years, India acquired 48 more words, a 70% increase. If this trend continues, the 2074 QDR will consist entirely of one long paragraph about India.

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QDR Blogging: Domestic IEDs

This is odd, from page 20 of the QDR:

Enhance domestic counter-lED capabilities: To better prepare the Department to support civil authorities seeking to counter potential threats from domestic improvised explosive devices (IEDs). DoD will assist civil authorities with counter-IED tactics, techniques, and procedures (TIPs) and capabilities developed in recent operations.

This is the first I've heard of serious concern about domestic IEDs. Something that intel picked up? On the one hand, the idea that some notional domestic terror cell (whether Islamic, right wing, or otherwise) might utilize IEDs is a good deal more believable that the usual stuff about taking down a jetliner with a Stinger or cutting down the Brooklyn Bridge with blowtorches. On the other hand, good IED production does require skill and some resources, and I don't imagine that successfully blowing up a couple of SUVs on I-70 would really be worth the time and risk to any domestic terrorist org.

UPDATE: To be clear, I appreciate that Timothy McVeigh's Ryder truck and the aircraft used on 9/11 were technically "IEDs." However, the QDR isn't using the term in this sense; it's fairly clear from context that the more road-specific meaning of the term in intended (with the inclusion of car bombs possible, but not necessary.)

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QDR Blogging: The Long War is Over

• References to the "Long War" in 2006 QDR: 31, not counting the 10 pages in the chapter titled "Fighting the Long War"
• References to the "Long War" in 2010 QDR: 0

The 2006 QDR was explicitly structured around the concept of the "Long War," which is essentially another name for the War on Terror. The Long War is more or less defined as follows:

Since 2001 the U.S. military has been continuously at war, but fighting a conflict that is markedly different from wars of the past. The enemies we face are not nation-states but rather dispersed non-state networks. In many cases, actions must occur on many continents in countries with which the United States is not at war. Unlike the image many have of war, this struggle cannot be won by military force alone, or even principally. And it is a struggle that may last for some years to come.

The chapter "Fighting the Long War" then includes references to the war in Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, operations in the Horn of Africa and the Trans-Sahara, tsunami relief, earthquake relief in Pakistan, "stabilization" operations in Haiti, assistance to the government of Colombia, and domestic initiatives such as bio-terror preparedness and civil support. The Long War concept provided a unifying framework for thinking through a multi-continental strategy for fighting "terror," epitomized not simply in terrorist networks but also in terror-supporting states and in the conditions that allow terror to grow. Re-reading this chapter, I find it striking the degree to which the Cold War could easily be substituted for the Long War, with communists playing the role of terrorists. This is to say that the threats to the United States and its interests were represented in a fashion that's not quite monolithic, but is nevertheless singular. Rather than responding to multiple, quite different crises around the world, the 2006 QDR wanted us to understand US military operations as part of a coherent strategic response to the threat posed by terror, much in the same way that the various forms of Containment were responses to the threat posed by the USSR and international revolutionary communism.

In the 2010 QDR, not so much. The United States is fighting "wars" rather than a "Long War" which is a crucial distinction to my mind. "Complexity" is the watchword, and each of the major conflicts involving the United States is treated distinctly, rather than as part of a tapestry. It must be said that this change makes the argument much less fluid; a Long War makes much more thematic sense than a series of not-terribly-related conflicts that involve some interest or other of the United States in some or another part of the globe. What it lacks in narrative, however, it makes up for in general good sense.

More tomorrow.

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Why the QDR Matters

By and large, progressives don’t care so much about the QDR. This shouldn’t be taken as an absolute statement; every progressive think tank has specialists on defense, there are many progressive journalists who take an interest in defense and security issues, and there are plenty of ordinary progressives who do think regularly about things like the QDR. I'm nevertheless confident, however, in the contention that defense wonkish types are found more often in conservative circles than progressive, that conservative organizations spend more time on defense issues than progressive organizations, and that typical, everyday Joe/Jill Conservative is more knowledgeable on defense and military issues than typical, everyday Joe/Jill Progressive. The central reason for this is not difficult to articulate; conservatives (at least in the current American construction of the term) are more likely to favor the use of force, are more likely to favor high defense budgets, are more likely to focus on military capability as a central component of American identity, and (statistically) are more likely to have served or know someone who has served in the military than are progressives.

Moreover, I suspect that there's broad agreement among people who self-identify as progressive that the current defense budget of the United States is wildly oversized relative to the threats that the United States faces. In this context, arcane discussions about preference for this weapon over that, or this capability rather than the other, or the elimination of this platform in favor of that platform, seem like debates either over the number of angels who can dance on the head of a pin, or the arrangement of deck chairs on the Titanic. For the former, the QDR and the precise makeup of the defense budget are part of an unfortunate reality of American politics, the details of which aren't particularly relevant. For the latter, the imperial proclivities of the outsized defense establishment and the negative effects of the military-industrial complex on American life make micro-discussion of defense issues essentially beside the point. In both cases, valuable time required for digestion of detail is better spent on other, more important and perhaps more contingent issues.

Both of these perspectives get much more right than they do wrong. Nevertheless, let me suggest two reasons why progressives should pay much closer attention to statements of strategy such as the QDR than they do. The first reason is that debates about the makeup of the defense budget and the construction of the QDR happen whether progressives are involved in them or not. There is something to the idea of granting too much legitimacy to the abjectly idiotic idea that the United States needs to militarily outspend the rest of the world, but check it out; the US outspends (or very nearly outspends) the rest of the world anyway. Progressive engagement with the finer aspects of the defense debate can hardly make things worse. The second reason is that the details really do matter. The 2010 QDR is quite a bit different than the 2006, which was quite a bit different than the 2000. The precepts set forth in the QDR are often honored in the breach, but they nevertheless help structure what the military will look like, and consequently what the military will be good and bad at for decades to come. You could argue that the 2010 QDR pays only lip service to climate change and to the humanitarian potential of military capability, but this lip service will be replicated in policy in ways that will affect how the US military is structured, behaves, and interacts with the real world. The US military is a huge organization of organizations, and by virtue of its size even small course corrections affect the lives of millions of people.

Again, there is a touch of caricature to the picture I'm drawing here. Ideally, however, I'd like to have a community of people who could speak intelligently and passionately about a) whether militarized-humanitarian intervention in Haiti raised the spectre of US imperialism in Latin America, b) what US military platforms and capabilities were best suited to having a positive effect on the situation in Haiti, and most importantly c) how a and b matter to each other.

In any case, over the next few days I'll be going over the QDR in detail, on this blog and elsewhere. I heartily recommend that people give the document a read, keep up with the commentary, and perhaps even read the 2006 version.

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